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In conclusion
Provided the rental arrangement is handled at arm's
length, under a bona fide landlord-tenant relationship, rents
paid to a spouse for the spouse's solely owned property, the
spouse's portion of tenancy in common property or the
spouse's portion of joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety
property (if state law recognizes that each owner is entitled
to a portion of the income) should be deductible by the
lessor and reportable as rent by the lessee.  Under D.
Sherman Cox,24 that should be the outcome even if the
spouses file a joint return.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1994
In addition to the provisions summarized at p. 170
supra, the 1994 Act also included the following changes.
The Act provides that the automatic stay does not apply to: 
(1) governmental tax audits;
(2) issuances of tax deficiencies;
(3) demands for tax returns; or
(4) tax assessments or notices and demands for payment
of the assessment.
Tax liens filed after a petition do not attach to property by
reason of an assessment unless the tax is nondischargeable
or the property securing the lien leaves the estate or revests
in the debtor. Sec. 116, adding 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(9).
The 1994 Act also provides that a Chapter 11 plan may
not modify a claim secured by the debtor’s principal
residence. Sec. 206, adding 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(4).
The 1994 Act makes debts nondischargeable if incurred
to pay a tax to the United States that would have been
nondischargeable under Section 523(a)(1). Sec. 221, adding
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(14).
In Chapter 11, 12 and 13 cases, if a plan includes the
curing of a default, the amount necessary to cure the default
is to be determined under the underlying debt agreement and
applicable nonbankruptcy law. Sec. 305, adding 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1123(d), 1222(d), 1322(e).
The 1994 Act provides that a debtor may not avoid a
nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in
implements, professional books, tools of the trade, farm
animals or crops of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor
to the extent the value of the property exceeds $5,000 if the
debtor’s state law (1) allows the debtor to waive the federal
exemptions or prohibits the debtor from claiming the federal
exemptions and (2) permits the debtor to claim state
exemptions without limitation as to the amount except
against consensual liens. Sec. 310, adding 11 U.S.C. §
522(f)(3).
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
DISCHARGE. The debtor was an officer, director and
50 percent shareholder of a corporation which was licensed
under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act
(PACA). The corporation purchased, but did not pay for,
produce from a creditor. The creditor claimed that the
debtor was liable for payment for the produce and that the
debt was nondischargeable because of defalcation as a
fiduciary by the debtor since the debtor failed to preserve
the PACA trust to pay for the produce. The court held that
in order for the nondischarge of a debt for defalcation as a
fiduciary in a trust, an express or constructive trust must
exist between the debtor and creditor. The court held that an
express or constructive trust was not created by PACA
because (1) no identifiable trust res exists since PACA
allows trust assets to be commingled with the produce
buyer’s other assets, (2) PACA does not impose fiduciary
obligations on produce buyers, and (3) the PACA trust
provisions act as a super lien on the produce buyer’s assets.
The court also noted that an issue of fact remained as to
whether the creditor complied with the PACA notice
procedures and as to whether the sales involved contained
payment provisions of 30 days or less and were,  therefore,
protected by PACA. In re Snyder, 171 B.R. 532 (Bankr.
D. Md. 1994).
ESTATE PROPERTY. In 1965 a trust was created by
the debtor’s parents, the debtor and the debtor’s sister. The
settlors contributed their fractional interests in ranch land
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and mineral interests in the land in exchange for a lifetime
interest in the trust equal to the settlor’s interest in the land
and mineral interests. When the parents died, the two sisters
each had an equal interest in the trust. The trust contained
discretionary distribution clauses and spendthrift clauses
and provided each beneficiary with a special power of
appointment over the beneficiary’s interest in trust corpus.
The debtor sought to exclude the debtor’s interest in the
trust, under Section 541(a), as an interest in a spendthrift
trust. The court held that because the debtor was one of the
settlors, the trust was not eligible for spendthrift trust
treatment and was estate property but that the power of
appointment was not estate property. In re Shurley, 171
B.R. 769 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994).
The debtor was chairman of the board of directors,
president and 51.6 percent shareholder of a corporation
which established a Simplified Employee Plan (SEP) for the
debtor under I.R.C. § 408(k). The debtor claimed the SEP
was not estate property under ERISA or was exempt under
Section 522(b)(2)(A). The court held that the SEP was
estate property because the ERISA anti-alienation provision
did not apply to the SEP since the debtor could withdraw
funds from the SEP, subject only to a small tax penalty. For
the same reasons, the court held that the SEP was not
eligible for the New York exemption under N.Y. Debtor &
Creditor Law § 282. In re Taft, 171 B.R. 497 (Bankr. E.D.
N.Y. 1994).
EXEMPTIONS.
IRA. The Massachusetts exemption for IRA’s, Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 235, § 34A, was not preempted by ERISA
and was not governed by ERISA. In re Printy, 171 B.R.
448 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
DISPOSABLE INCOME. The Bankruptcy Court
calculated the debtor’s final disposable income at the end of
the Chapter 12 plan by adding all of the debtor’s assets,
including two post-plan farm program payments and
subtracting the outstanding obligations. The calculation
provided the debtor with about $250,000 in carryover funds
but the debtor claimed that the remaining disposable income
was necessary to prevent the debtor from borrowing funds
to finance the next year’s operations. The appellate court
held that the farm program payments were included in
disposable income because the payments related to crop
years during the plan. The court also held that, because
farmers normally are required to borrow for financing their
operations, the calculation of disposable income need not
leave the debtor with sufficient funds to completely finance
the next year’s operations. In re Broken Bow Ranch, Inc.,
33 F.3d 1005 (8th Cir. 1994).
    CHAPTER 13   -ALM § 13.03.*
DISPOSABLE INCOME. The debtor claimed monthly
social security disability payments of $900 as exempt and
excluded the payments from the disposable income
available to fund the Chapter 13 plan, which provided only
3 percent payment of unsecured claims. The exemption was
allowed but the trustee argued that the payments should
have been included in disposable income. Citing In re
Schnabel, 153 B.R. 809 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993) and In re
Morse, 164 B.R. 651 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1994), the court
held that the disability payments must be included in
determining disposable income during the plan. In re
Hagel, 171 B.R. 686 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1994).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
CLAIMS. The debtor filed for Chapter 13, a creditors’
meeting was scheduled and a claims bar date noticed to all
creditors, including the IRS. The case was dismissed soon
after the first creditors’ meeting but was reinstated a few
days later. Another creditors’ meeting was scheduled but a
new bar date for claims was not set. The IRS filed a claim
after the original bar date but within 90 days after the
second creditors’ meeting. The court held that the claim
would not be allowed as untimely because the reinstatement
of the case reinstated the original claims bar date and the
court had no authority to extend the bar date after the bar
date had passed. Note: Pub. L. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106
(1994) increases the bar date for IRS claims to 180 days
after the first creditors’ meeting. In re Robert, 171 B.R.
881 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1994).
The IRS filed a secured claim for pre-petition taxes
secured by a tax lien. The Bankruptcy Court reduced the
secured portion of the claim by the value of the debtor’s
property exempt from the levy under I.R.C. § 6334 and by
the amount of post-petition estimated taxes owed by the
debtor. The appellate court reversed, holding that Section
6334 could not be used to reduce the secured portion of the
IRS claim because Section 6334 applied only to levies. The
court also held that estate property may not be used to pay
post-petition obligations of the debtor; therefore, property
securing the IRS claim could not be used to pay post-
petition taxes. U.S. v. Parmele, 171 B.R. 895 (N.D. Okla.
1994).
LOSSES. The debtor had a net operating loss for 1986
and filed for bankruptcy in 1987. The case was closed in
1988 but reopened in 1989.  In 1990 the debtor filed
amended returns for 1983, 1984 and 1985 using the
carryback of the net operating loss because the bankruptcy
estate did not make use of the net operating losses from
1986. The IRS denied the refund claims based on lapse of
the statute of limitations for refund claims. The debtor
argued that the statute of limitations was tolled by the
bankruptcy case. The court held that the tolling of the statute
of limitations provided by 11 U.S.C. § 346(i) was
specifically made not applicable to federal taxes by 11
U.S.C. § 346(a); therefore, the statute of limitations for tax
refunds was not tolled by the bankruptcy case. In re Page,
94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,541 (Bankr. D. Kan.
1994).
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
CLEAN WATER ACT-ALM § 2.03.* The plaintiffs
were neighbors of a dairy and crop farm operated by the
defendant farm partnership. The plaintiffs alleged several
violations of the Clean Water Act by the defendants from
runoff of manure applied to fields and chemicals used to
wash the defendant’s milking facility and added to the
manure spread on the field. The jury found four violations
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of the Clean Water Act for which the trial court entered
judgment for the defendant as a matter of law (formerly
judgment n.o.v.) because the discharges were not point-
sourced. The first violation involved a swale which
collected liquid manure spread by tankers on the
defendant’s fields. The swale drained through a pipe in a
stonewall into a ditch which drained into a stream and
eventually into a river. The trial court ruled that the
discharge was not point-sourced because the manure
naturally drained off the field in too diffuse a manner to
create a point-sourced discharge. The appellate court
reversed, holding that the flow of the manure through the
pipe created a point source for the discharge sufficient to
violate the Act. In addition, the court held that the manure
spreader tankers themselves were point sources for the
discharge. The second and third violations involved
testimony of a witness who observed manure tankers
entering a field several times for dumping of manure. The
trial court ruled that the testimony was insufficient evidence
of Act violations. The appellate court reversed, holding that
the jury had enough information to find point-source
violations of the Act. The fourth violation involved run-off
of manure after a heavy rain. The trial court found that the
discharge qualified for the exemption for stormwater
discharges. The appellate court reversed, holding that the
exemption did not apply because the evidence showed that
the field had been overly saturated with manure. The
defendant argued that the farm was not a concentrated
animal feeding operation (CAFO) under 40 C.F.R. §
122.23(b)(1), subject to the ACT because crops were also
grown on the farm. The appellate court held that the farm
was a CAPO because the crops were not grown on the same
land as the livestock was raised. In other words, in order for
the farm to not be a CAPO, the livestock had to be raised on
the same land where the crops were grown.  Concerned
Area Residents v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir.
1994), rev’g, 834 F. Supp. 1422 (W.D. N.Y. 1993).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES
ACT-ALM § 10.05[2].* The defendant received 665 cartons
of lettuce from the plaintiff on a “price after sale” contract.
The testimony demonstrated that a “price after sale”
contract was used because the lettuce was of a quality less
than Grade A and the contract price would be determined by
the price the dealer could get for the produce. The defendant
eventually dumped most of the lettuce without obtaining a
dumping certificate required by PACA regulations, 7 C.F.R.
§§ 46.14, 46.22. The defendant first argued that the
regulations did not apply to “price after sale” contracts
because of the substandard quality of the produce involved.
The court held that PACA and its regulations governed
“price after sale” contracts for the sale of agricultural
commodities. The defendant then argued that the plaintiff
had orally agreed to the dumping without a certificate. The
court held that an oral agreement was insufficient to allow a
non-certified dumping unless the defendant had accurate
and complete records of the dumping to demonstrate that the
produce was worthless. Because the defendant had no
written evidence of the agreement nor any records of the
circumstances of the dumping, the defendant was liable for
the value of the produce for unjustified destruction of the
produce. Tom Lange Co., Inc. v. A. Gagliano Co., Inc.,
859 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Wis. 1994).
PESTICIDES-ALM § 2.04.* The plaintiff’s decedent
was killed during and as a result of the application of a
pesticide manufactured by the defendant. The plaintiff’s
cause of action had three counts based on the defendant’s
failure to warn about the dangerous nature of the pesticide
and two counts based on a defective product. The court held
that the first three counts were preempted by FIFRA. The
court determined that the other two counts were based upon
the Alabama Extended Manufacturer’s Liability Doctrine
(AEMLD), a court-created doctrine governing liability for
defective products. The court found that the AEMLD
provided an affirmative defense of assumption of risk which
required a jury finding that the label warnings on a
dangerous product were insufficient. Because an essential
element of an affirmative defense of the AEMLD involved
the adequacy of the pesticide’s labels, the AEMLD counts
were also preempted by FIFRA. Pitts v. Dow Chemical
Co., 859 F.Supp. 543 (M.D. Ala. 1994).
TOBACCO. The plaintiff was a tobacco grower and
dealer whose records showed that the plaintiff sold more
tobacco than was purchased from other producers. The
USDA assessed the plaintiff penalties, under 7 C.F.R. §
725.94(d), (e), for the sale of excess tobacco. The plaintiff
argued that the regulations had no statutory authority
because the statute, 7 U.S.C. § 1314(a), only imposed a
penalty for the purchase of excess, i.e. non-quota, tobacco
and did not impose a penalty for the resale of the excess
tobacco. The court held that the regulation penalty was
based on the assumption that any tobacco sold by a resaler
in excess of the tobacco purchased was excess tobacco;
therefore, the penalty was based upon the presumed
purchase of excess tobacco and not on the resale of the
excess tobacco. Because the regulation penalty applied to
the purchase of excess tobacco as provided in the statute, the
regulation penalty was proper. The court noted that the
presumption was rebuttable and required the plaintiff to
show the origin of the tobacco sold in excess of the tobacco
purchased. Because the District Court had only ruled that
the regulation was invalid, the case was remanded for
further hearing. Cole v. USDA, 33 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir.
1994).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[4].* The
decedent’s estate included a one-half interest in farmland
with the other half owned by the decedent’s sister. The
decedent’s will bequeathed the half interest to any
governmental agency or other organization so long as the
property is maintained as a historical family farm, botanical
garden or similar noncommercial or nonresidential use. The
bequest was limited to nine months after the decedent’s
death but allowed the executor the discretion to allow
additional time for finding an organization which was
willing to receive the property under the will’s conditions.
The executor was unable to find a willing donee within nine
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months but had extended the period because a state agency
had expressed a desire to obtain the property. The IRS ruled
that because no organization accepted the gift within the
will’s nine month limitation, the property would pass to the
state agency as a result of the executor’s decision and not
under the will; therefore, the bequest was not eligible for the
charitable deduction.  Ltr. Rul. 9443001, April 14, 1993.
The decedent's will bequeathed $50,000 to a school to
fund scholarships for needy students. The will provided that
if the school ceased to operate as a school or lost its
accreditation, the money was to revert to the will’s residuary
beneficiaries. Under state law, bequests to schools subject to
reversions became absolute after 30 years. The IRS ruled
that if the possibility of the failure of the gift was so remote
as to be negligible, the gift would qualify for the charitable
deduction. The ruling did not make a determination on the
possibility of the gift failing. Ltr. Rul. 9443004, Jan. 7,
1994.
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS-ALM §
5.04[6].* A parent established a trust in 1962 for the benefit
of the parent and the parent’s child. At the death of the
parent, the trust became irrevocable and the child became
the primary beneficiary. The trust provided that on the death
of the child, the trust was to be split into as many trusts as
the child had children with the trust corpus to be distributed
when each grandchild became 21. The trust also provided
that the child could extend the period of the trusts for the
grandchildren. The child’s will contained a provision
extending the trusts until the death of each grandchild. The
trust provided each grandchild with the power to appoint
trust property only to the grandchild’s children. The IRS
ruled that the corpus and accumulated income of the trusts
would not be included in the gross estates of the
grandchildren. In addition, the IRS ruled that the extension
of the grandchildren’s trusts periods would not subject the
trusts to GSTT as a constructive addition to the trust. The
IRS noted that if the grandchildren also appoint the trust
property to great grandchildren, such appointments may
postpone or suspend the vesting or absolute ownership of
the trust for a period greater than the measuring lives plus
21 years from the date the trust became irrevocable,
subjecting the trust to GSTT. Ltr. Rul. 9443026, July 27,
1994.
The parents created an irrevocable trust in 1924 for the
benefit of the parents and their two children. One parent
exercised a testamentary power of appointment over a
portion of the trust to the son who eventually appointed the
portion of the trust to the son’s widow. The widow’s share
was held by another trust and the only remaining beneficiary
was the daughter and her two children. The widow’s trust
and the daughter agreed to terminate the trust with
distributions of trust property based roughly on the interests
in the trust. The differences of shares were caused by
compromises made to avoid litigation between the parties.
The IRS ruled that the GSTT did not apply to the
termination of the trust and distribution of the principal. Ltr.
Rul. 9442018, July 19, 1994.
RETURNS. The estate was granted an extension to file
its estate tax return until July 21, 1990, a Saturday. The
estate mailed the return on Friday, July 20, 1990 and the
IRS received the return on Monday July 23, 1990. The IRS
mailed a notice of deficiency on July 23, 1993. The estate
argued that the three year statute of limitations of I.R.C. §
6501 had expired on July 22, 1993. The court held that
because the return was considered timely because the
extension due date fell on a Saturday and was extended to
Monday July 23, 1990, that date determined the start of the
running of the statute of limitations. The court held that
where the due date was extended because the date fell on a
weekend, the date of delivery was used to determine the
timeliness of the return. Estate of Mitchell v. Comm’r, 103
T.C. No. 30 (1994).
SPECIAL USE VALUATION-ALM § 5.03[2].* On the
death of the decedent in 1983, the estate made the special
use valuation election for farmland and the qualified heirs
signed and filed the agreement to the election and to be
liable for any recapture tax. In 1990, the IRS discovered that
some of the land was rented for cash to third parties. The
IRS issued a deficiency notice for recapture of the special
use valuation benefits relating to the cash rented land. The
heirs argued that the initial election was invalid and that the
IRS had notice of the invalidity from the date of the election
because the heirs included cash rent income on the estate’s
Schedule F of the income tax return. Therefore, the statute
of limitations had expired as to the election. The court held
that, because some of the estate’s farmland was not included
in the special use valuation election, the IRS could have
reasonably assumed that the cash rents came from that land
and not the special use valued land. In addition, the court
held that the heirs were under a duty to file consistent
returns and could not now claim a prior election as invalid
when the heirs had acted for several years as if the election
was valid. LeFever v. Comm’r, 103 T.C. No. 31 (1994).
The decedent’s estate included property used as a stone
quarry which had been transferred to a trust for the benefit
of the decedent’s niece and nephew. The decedent had
operated a quarry on the land and was active in the
management of the business. The estate made a properly
filed special use valuation election for the property. The IRS
ruled that the mineral interest in the stone in the quarry was
not eligible for special use valuation but that the other real
property involved was eligible for the election. The IRS
noted that the special use valuation could not be used to
value the property for GSTT purposes, resulting from the
transfer in trust to the niece and nephew. Ltr. Rul. 9443003,
Dec. 10, 1993.
VALUATION. The decedent’s estate included a 78
percent interest in the common stock of a corporation which
owned a 1300 acre ranch, a one-third interest in a closely-
held corporation which owned wetlands used for hunting,
and 41.8 percent of a liquidating trust. The court rejected the
estate’s liquidation valuation and comparative property
valuation of the ranch and wetlands because the properties
were not going to be sold and the comparable properties
used were not sufficiently similar. The corporation was
valued using the value of the corporation’s assets less a 20
percent discount for lack of marketability, based on the
nonliquid nature of the assets because the land was subject
to state restrictions. The estate was allowed a 20 percent
discount for a minority interest and a 15 percent discount for
lack of marketability of the wetland, also because the land
was subject to state restrictions. The value of the interest in
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the liquidating trust was discounted 10 percent for lack of
marketability but the court did not allow any discount for a
minority interest because minority interest holders were
protected by the trustee’s fiduciary duty. Luton v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1994-539.
The decedent owned a 50 percent undivided interest in
farmland and a homestead. The estate discounted the fair
market value of the properties by 25 percent for lack of
marketability, lack of control and difficulty of obtaining
financing for a purchase of a partial interest. The IRS argued
that the farmland could be easily partitioned and applied a
discount of 6.54 percent for costs involved in partitioning
the farmland. The court held that the land could be
partitioned but allowed a 20 percent discount for the costs
involved. Both parties agreed that the homestead could not
be partitioned but disagreed as to the discount allowed for
the costs of a forced sale. The court held that a 20 percent
discount was appropriate to cover the costs of a sale.  Estate
of Cervin v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-550.
The taxpayers, husband and wife, owned a house
situated on 10 acres and transferred the residence and land
to a trust. The 10 acres were split into three contiguous lots
but the entire 10 acres were treated as one unit for property
tax purposes. The well for the residence was in one of the
adjacent lots and only the house lot had an access road. The
three lots have been used as a single homestead since at
least 1951 and there were several large homesteads nearby.
The IRS ruled that the entire 10 acres constituted a
residence for purposes of Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-5(c)
governing the exception from valuation under I.R.C. § 2702
of interests in personal residence trusts. Ltr. Rul. 9442019,
July 19, 1994.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
C CORPORATIONS
STOCK EXPENSES. The IRS has issued a ruling that
stock distribution costs required under 17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-
1 (Rule 12b-1 plans) are deductible as ordinary and
necessary business expenses. Rev. Rul. 94-70, I.R.B. 1994-
47, amplifying, Rev. Rul. 73-463, 1973-2 C.B. 34.
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS-ALM §
4.02[14].* The taxpayers brought an action for personal
injuries resulting from an explosion caused by a gas leak in
their home. The taxpayers received a jury award and an
award of prejudgment interest from the date of the
explosion. The court held that the prejudgment interest was
excludible from gross income as an element of the
compensatory damages for the personal injuries. Brabson v.
U.S., 859 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Colo. 1994).
DEPRECIATION. The taxpayer was a corporation
which operated wind turbine electrical generators. The
taxpayer claimed depreciation for two turbines which were
constructed in one taxable year but were incapable of
generating electricity because of missing parts. One turbine
was completed in the next taxable year but the other turbine
was never completed. The court held that the taxpayer could
not take the depreciation deduction in the year the turbines
were constructed, the depreciation deduction could be taken
for the turbine which was completed in the tax year of the
completion, but no depreciation deduction was allowed for
the uncompleted turbine. 85 Gorgonio Wind Generating
Co. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-544.
HOBBY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[1].*  The taxpayer
owned a tax return preparation business and operated an
endurance horse business. The taxpayer combined the
expenses and income from the two businesses, claiming that
the purpose of the horse business was to gain clients for the
tax return business. However, the taxpayer had no clients
from the community of horse owners or investors, kept poor
records for the horse business, had no profits from the horse
business and made no effort to increase the profitability of
the horse business. The court held that the horse business
was not operated with the intent to make a profit and
disallowed all deductions in excess of income. Pederson v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-555.
INTEREST. The taxpayer overpaid its 1981 taxes on
June 15, 1982. Due to an increase in a carryback from 1982,
the  amount of the taxpayer overpaid taxes increased on
March 15, 1983. On October 17, 1984, the IRS issued a
refund check for more than the taxpayer was entitled to
receive. The IRS ruled that the taxpayer was entitled to
interest on the first amount of overpaid taxes from June 15,
1982 to October 17, 1984. In addition, the taxpayer was
entitled to interest on the additional overpayment of taxes
from March 15, 1983 to October 17, 1984. Ltr. Rul.
9443007, May 19, 1994.
INVESTMENT INTEREST-ALM § 4.03[12].* The
taxpayer had excess investment expenses in 1984 which the
taxpayer carried over to 1985. The carryover amount
exceeded the taxpayer’s 1984 taxable income. The 1985
carryover amount resulted in excess investment expenses in
1985 which the taxpayer carried over to 1986. Again, the
carryover amount exceeded the taxpayer’s 1985 taxable
income.  The IRS argued that the amount of excess
investment expense which exceeded the taxpayer’s taxable
income could not be carried over to the next tax year. The
court held that a taxpayer’s carryover of excess investment
interest deduction in subsequent taxable years was not
limited by the taxpayer’s taxable income. The court also
held that because the history of litigation of this issue has
been uniformly contrary to the IRS’s position, the IRS’s
position was not substantially justified and assessed the IRS
for the taxpayer’s costs, including attorney’s fees.
Allbritton v. Comm’r, 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,550 (5th Cir. 1994), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1993-490.
LOSSES. The taxpayers sold their video rental store to
their parents and claimed a capital loss on the sale. The
court held that the sale was not bona fide because the
taxpayers presented no evidence that the taxpayers sought
the best price for the business or that the price reflected the
value of the inventory or the business as a going concern. In
addition, the court held that the taxpayers’ filing of a gift tax
return for the transaction also demonstrated that the sale was
not bona fide. Bissey v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-540.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS. In 1990, the
IRS filed a Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment
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(FPAA) against a limited partnership of which the taxpayer
was a limited partner. The tax matters partner contested the
FPAA and eventually settled the suit which assessed the
limited partners $1,335 in income taxes. The taxpayer
argued that the taxpayer was not bound by the settlement
because the settlement was obtained through fraud,
misrepresentation and nondisclosure by the tax matters
partner. The court held that the settlement could be set aside
only if the fraud was made by the opposing party, the IRS;
therefore, because the taxpayer did not allege any fraud or
misrepresentation by the IRS, the IRS was entitled to
summary judgment.  Kluver v. U.S., 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,540 (D. Minn. 1993).
The taxpayers were less than one percent limited
partners in cattle leasing partnerships which were partners in
several joint ventures. The partnerships were the tax matters
partners in the joint ventures. The IRS issued an FPAA for
the joint ventures and the tax matters partner eventually
settled with the IRS such that the taxpayers’ taxable income
was increased. Although the taxpayers were notified of all
proceedings and the eventual settlement, the taxpayers made
no objections. The taxpayers’ partnership agreements
expressly gave the partnerships authority to act as the tax
matters partners. The court held that the taxpayers lacked
standing to challenge the IRS assessment of additional
taxable income resulting from the FPAA because the
taxpayers failed to allege any injury caused by the IRS since
the taxpayers failed to object to the FPAA. Clark v. U.S.,
94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,563 (E.D. N.C. 1994).
DEFINITION. The partnership had an individual and a
corporation as its general partners and two classes of limited
partners. With the approval of over 50 percent of the first
class of limited partners, the individual general partner
contributed the partnership interest to the corporation
general partner, leaving the corporation as the only general
partner. The IRS ruled that the partnership would be taxed
as a partnership because the partnership lacked two of the
four corporate characteristics. The IRS ruled that the
partnership lacked the corporate characteristic of continuity
of life because the continuation of the partnership required
approval of all of the limited partners. The IRS ruled that
the partnership lacked the corporate characteristic of free
transferability of interests because the general partners could
not withdraw from the partnership nor transfer their interests
to third parties without the consent of the limited partners
and the limited partners could not transfer their interests to
third parties without the consent of the general partners. Ltr.
Rul. 9443020, July 25, 1994.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES. A limited
partnership with all individuals as members converted to a
Utah Limited Liability Company (LLC) with all partners
contributing their partnership interests to the LLC in
exchange for identical interests in the LLC. All of the
members were actively engaged in the business and all had
the power to manage the company. No nonmembers could
participate in LLC management. The state LLC act and the
LLC agreement provided that, upon a terminating event, the
LLC could be continued only with the consent of all of the
remaining members. The LLC act also provided that a
member could transfer an interest in the LLC but that the
transferee of the member’s interest had no right to
participate in the management of the LLC without the
unanimous consent of the other members. The LLC interests
were not subject to registration under state or federal law.
The IRS ruled that the LLC would be taxed as a partnership
because the LLC lacked the corporate characteristics of
continuity of life and free transferability of interests. The
IRS also ruled that the conversion of the partnership to an
LLC was not a termination and did not cause any
recognition of gain or loss. Ltr. Rul. 9443024, July 26,
1994.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
ONE CLASS OF STOCK. An S corporation had one
shareholder who served as chief executive officer of the
corporation. The corporation and the shareholder entered
into a ten year employment agreement that the shareholder
would serve as chief executive officer for 10 years with cost
of living increases in salary only plus the current benefits
received by the shareholder. The corporation agreed to make
certain payments in the event that the control of the
corporation changed or the shareholder died or became
disabled. If the shareholder’s employment was terminated
for any other reason, no payments were to be made.  The
IRS ruled that the agreement did not create a second class of
stock for purposes of the S corporation election. Ltr. Rul.
9442007, July 14, 1994.
TRAVEL EXPENSES . The taxpayer was transferred
by the taxpayer’s employer and incurred moving and other
expenses in relocating. The taxpayer’s employer reimbursed
the taxpayer for the expenses. The taxpayer claimed the
expenses as travel expenses. The court held that because the
taxpayer’s home changed with the move, the moving and
other associated expenses were not incurred “away from
home” and could not be claimed as travel expenses;
therefore, the reimbursement amounts were taxable income.
Girard v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-556.
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
PROCEEDS OF COLLATERAL. The debtor entered
into a contract with a third party to purchase cattle with the
third party’s money and feed the cattle at the debtor’s
ranches. When the cattle were sold, the debtor received a
portion of the proceeds equal to the proportion of the
debtor’s expenses to the total expenses for raising and
selling the cattle. The debtor fed the cattle crops raised by
the debtor which were subject to a security interest held by a
creditor. The creditor argued that the security interest
continued in amounts received by the debtor under U.C.C. §
9-306(2), (3) or (4). The court held that the security interest
did not continue under U.C.C. § 9-306(2) because the
feeding of the crops to the cattle was not a sale or other
disposition of the crops. However, the court held that the
security interest continued under U.C.C. § 9-306(3) or (4)
because the feeding of the crops was a sale or exchange of
the  crops   to   the   third   party   under   the   contract.  The
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bankruptcy trustee argued that the arrangement between the
debtor and the third party was a joint venture with the crops
contributed to the venture. The court held that the security
interest would still continue in the proceeds of the cattle
because the crops were exchanged for an interest in the
joint venture. In re Pelton, 171 B.R. 641 (Bankr. W.D.
Wis. 1994).
CITATION UPDATES
The annual social security tax and benefit amounts,
summaried at p. 175 supra, are published at 59 Fed. Reg.
54464 (Oct. 31, 1994).
Schmitz v. Comm’r, 34 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1994)
(court award and settlements) see p. 158 supra.
Alexander Shokai, Inc. v. Comm'r, 34 F.3d 1480 (9th
Cir. 1994), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1992-41 (constructive
dividends) see p. 159 supra.
Taggi v. U.S., 35 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 1994), aff’g, 835 F.
Supp. 744 (S.D. N.Y. 1993) (court awards and settlements)
see p. 166 supra.
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